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We analyze the impact of prosecutor elections on case backlogs. Pre-
vious evidence has shown that re-election pressures result in more cases
going to trial. Since trials require time and resources, one can expect an
e¤ect on the queue. Two competing theories are developed: one of signal-
ing quality in an asymmetric information environment and one of e¤ort
exertion, each of which can explain increased trials before election, but dif-
fer in their predictions regarding the impact on backlogs. A district-level,
panel data set of caseload ows in North Carolina is analyzed. Evidence is
presented that contested re-elections are associated with a decrease in the
number of cases handled and an acceleration of the growth of the backlog.
This suggests that retention concerns lead to signaling which causes dis-
tortions, re-allocating resources from disposing cases to prosecuting cases
at trial.
JEL codes: K41, D82
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze how electoral incentives of state prosecutors a¤ect an
important ingredient of the criminal justice system: case backlogs. A distinc-
tive feature of the United States criminal justice system is that some of the
important regulators of the system, such as prosecutors and judges, are gener-
ally elected by popular vote.1 Their inuence on the criminal justice system is
We thank Matthew Cole, Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl, Peter Grajzl, and Paul Pecorino;
along with seminar participants at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Saint Bonaventure Uni-
versity, Washington and Lee University, University of Sassari, American Law and Economics
Association, and Southern Economic Association.
1The four states that do not elect the prosecutors are Alaska, Connecticut, New Jersey,
and Rhode Island. For a discussion of judicial retention mechanisms see Shepherd (2009).
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enormous. There are 2344 local prosecutor o¢ ces in the U.S., which collectively
handle around 2.3 million felony cases each year (Perry, 2006) accounting for
approximately 95% of all criminal prosecutions (Simmons, 2004). Given their
importance in the functioning of the criminal justice system, one would like
to understand the impact that popular election of prosecutors has on how they
choose to exercise their discretion. Recent papers (Bandyopadhyay and McCan-
non, 2014a; 2014b) suggest that re-election motives a¤ect the mix of trials and
plea bargains. In particular, using data from North Carolina they nd that the
use of trials increases as elections approach. The e¤ect is enhanced for contested
campaigns. Given the limited resources available, a natural question to ask is
whether this has an e¤ect on case dispositions.
Rasmusen, Raghav, and Ramseyer (2009) investigate the decision to prose-
cute a case or dismiss it. They consider an environment where a prosecutor is in-
terested in allocating the o¢ ces budget and e¤ort to obtaining convictions, im-
proving conviction rates, and obtaining personal goals. Using a cross-sectional
dataset they show that increased budgets increase both conviction rates and the
number of convictions. They do not consider the e¤ect of re-election pressures
or analyze the decision to engage in plea bargaining versus proceeding to trial.
We extend their framework to incorporate both. It is shown in this e¤ort ex-
ertion environment that retention issues reduce backlogs as it discourages slack
resources. The framework is similar in nature to Gordon and Huber (2002) who
consider the impact of voters using observable signals of performance to induce
prosecutorial e¤ort. To get an alternate understanding of what may happen
as a result of electoral incentives increasing the use of trials, we also adapt the
framework of Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014a; 2014b) who focus on ad-
verse selection issues. In their model prosecutors use resources to the full and,
thus, when they increase trials they have to do so at the expense of being able
2
to process fewer cases, leading to an increase in backlogs. While both the e¤ort
exertion and signaling environments can explain the empirical observations of
increased use of the courtroom and reduced plea bargaining during re-election
season, they di¤er in their predictions regarding the impact on case backlogs.
We carry out an empirical analysis using a panel dataset of caseload work-
ows from North Carolina to see which of the two theories does the empirical
evidence support. The results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis but
not with that of increased e¤ort. Three variable are analyzed: the number of
cases left pending, the change in the backlog from the beginning to the end of the
year, and the number of cases dismissed. Our results show the rst two increase,
consistent with the hypothesis that prosecutors divert resources to pursue more
trials. Interestingly, the number of dismissed cases decreases, which contributes
to the backlog.
This has important policy implications If elections encourage enhanced ef-
fort, then those states in the U.S. which do not use elections as well as European
policymakers, for example, may need to consider replacing their appointment
systems. Alternatively, if re-election pressure distorts the criminal justice sys-
tem, as is argued here, alternative institutions should be considered.
This work is related to the research on the allocation of resources as well as
work on career concerns of prosecutors. Early analysis of prosecutors focused
on the allocation of the o¢ ces budget and the role of plea bargaining (Landes,
1971; Forst and Brosi, 1977). Glaesar, Kessler, and Piehl (2000) nd evidence
that career concerns a¤ect the decisions of federal U.S. Attorneys and, speci-
cally, has led to an increase in the federalization of drug crimes. Boylan (2004)
connects salaries and turnover and Boylan (2005) analyzes data of chief federal
prosecutors (who are appointed rather than elected) and their subsequent ca-
reers. Boylan and Long (2005) show that prosecutors use experience in trials as
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a career advancement mechanism. The retention of local prosecutors has also
been qualitatively analyzed by Wright (2009), who presents stylized facts on
media coverage of these elections. Dyke (2007) considers case-level data show-
ing that fewer cases are dismissed when prosecutors run for re-election. Finally,
McCannon (2013) demonstrates that appeals of criminal convictions are more
successful when the prosecutor was running for re-election during the time of
the trial, necessitating more modications of lower-court convictions.
There is a growing literature which analyzes how career concerns a¤ect the
behavior of public o¢ cials. Hanssen (1999) argues that knowledge of how court
decisions will a¤ect powerful groups, who provide support for elected judges,
narrows the range of likely rulings. This diminishes the uncertainty and, conse-
quently, decreases the amount of litigation. Hanssen (2000) provides evidence
that independent judges, less inuenced by political motives, provide adminis-
trative agencies the incentive to spend more e¤ort attempting to protect their
actions from judicial review. Shepherd (2009) analyzes the voting behavior of
state supreme court judges and nds it is inuenced by the preferences of the
electorate. Berdejo and Yuchtman (2013) analyze data on Washington state
judges and nd that sentences are around 10% longer at the end of a judges
political cycle than the beginning. Lim (2013) estimates a dynamic structural
model to see how competitive elections versus appointment by the Governor
a¤ect the sentencing decisions of judges and nds strong evidence that elections
inuence judicial behavior. Finally, Dimitrova-Grajzl, Grajzl, Sustersic, and
Zajc (2012a) provide evidence from Slovenian courts that promotion opportu-
nities increase the number of cases handled by a judge.
Related work on the incentives of regulators also reveals interesting issues.
Leaver (2009) considers an environment of asymmetric information on the qual-
ity of public servants. She analyzes the impact of the length of term in o¢ ce on
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how diligently the reputationally-motivated bureaucrat regulates. Schotts and
Wiseman (2010) present an asymmetric information model where investigators
di¤er on the aggressiveness with which they pursue charges. While not about
the behavior of prosecutors, these papers show strong evidence that retention
motives impact the outcome of the justice system.
Additionally, there are a number of papers on signaling in asymmetric infor-
mation environments between a prosecutor and a defense attorney. See Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1986) for an initial investigation and Reinganum (1998, 2000)
for applications addressing specic policy interventions.
We look at alternate theoretical models in section 2. Section 3 describes the
data and section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Consider the handling of cases by a prosecutors o¢ ce in a given period of time
(e.g. a year). Let N denote the total number of cases led, which is taken
as exogenous. Also, suppose there is a xed amount of resources R available
per period to handle the stock of cases. For each case led, the prosecutor can
either take it to trial, a = t, plea bargain the case, a = p, or do nothing, a = n.
For ease of exposition this action will be thought of as leaving the case pending.
We do not, though, di¤erentiate in the theoretical model between leaving a case
pending and dismissing the charges.2 The di¤erence between the two, from the
perspective of the caseload, is whether in future years a conviction is pursued.
The option n is one where a conviction is not currently pursued. Denote the
number of cases where action a is taken as Na. It follows, then, that Na  0
and Nt +Np +Nn = N .
2One can imagine that the decision is after the initial stink test has been conducted
eliminating inappropriate arrests. (Informal discussions with DA o¢ ce insiders reveal that
they use a di¤erent, but related, adjective for the test!)
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For each action taken on a case costs arise. Each case led incurs a cost
c  0. One may think of this cost as the expenses associated with processing
and the initial investigation of evidence presented to the prosecutors o¢ ce by
law enforcement. Cases plea bargained incur an additional cost of Cp, while
those taken to trial incur a cost Ct. Trials are very costly. A signicant amount
of public resources must be devoted to the judicial system and these are greater
for jury trials and, thus, consume a lot of the nancial resources of a prosecu-
tors o¢ ce. Plea bargaining is signicantly cheaper for everyone involved. Not
pursuing a conviction, then, saves these additional expenses. Dene  = Ct Cp
and, hence, assume  > 0. The resources available comprise a budget constraint
for the prosecutor. Hence,
R  cN + CpNp + CtNt: (1)
This setup assumes that there are no economies of scale or economies of scope
to prosecutorial production (which is, of course, a simplication), but rather a
constant marginal cost of case handling.
Suppose each case that arises during the period can be described by the
parameter , which represents the strength of evidence the prosector has against
the defendant in a criminal case. Assume  2 [0; m] where m <1. Each case
may be taken to trial, plea bargained, or left pending. On incurring the cost of
investigation, c, a prosecutor is able to discover the parameter  for each case.
Prosecuting cases provides benets. Let S () denote the expected sanction
achieved at trial. One can think of this as the expected value, taking into ac-
count not only the anticipated sanction, but also the likelihood of conviction,
quality of defense representation, parole opportunities, appeals, etc. As  is a
measurement of evidence, assume dSd > 0. Let P () denote the expected sen-
tence obtained with plea bargaining. Again, assume dPd > 0. Set the expected
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sanction of a = n equal to zero.
A number of assumptions are employed. First, plea bargaining achieves a
lower sanction than what is expected from trial. Hence, assume S () > P ()
8. To guarantee interior solutions assume that, for cases with su¢ ciently great
evidence, pursuing a conviction results in sanctions that exceed the cost and
that for cases with su¢ ciently weak evidence pursuing a conviction generates
an expected sanction less than the cost. Rather, there exists a a such that
S () > Ca 8 > a and S () < Ca 8 < a.3 Third, for ease of analysis assume
the rate of increase in S exceeds that of P so that for large values of  it is
preferable to pursue the conviction at trial. Rather, if D ()  S ()   P (),
then dDd > 0. Finally, there exists a 
0 where D ()   8  0.4
Hence, in each case the prosecutor observes  and selects an action a 2
ft; p; ng, which generates the expected, case-level utility of
u (a) =
8<: S ()  CtP ()  Cp
0
if a = t
if a = p
if a = n
: (2)
2.1 Decisionmaking with Resource Constraints
The optimal decisionmaking of a prosecutor in this environment is rather straight-
forward. For cases with high levels of evidence convictions are pursued at trial.
Specically, all cases with   0 result in u (t) being greatest. Cases with
 2 p; 0 result in u (p) being maximal since the utility to plea bargaining ex-




> 0 and Ca is a constant, a unique crossing-point exists
for each action. This assumption can be relaxed. With a binding budget constraint not all
cases can go to trial, while with a slack, xed cost budget constraint unused resources can used
to generate longer sanctions at trial. Alternatively, signaling motivations may drive a case to
trial even if plea bargaining is socially optimal (Bandyopadhyay and McCannon, 2013).
4While these assumptions seem strong, they are all based on the value of the parameter .
One could re-order the metric to ensure these assumptions hold. Thus, while we interpret 
to be a parameter measuring quality of evidence, the theoretical model simply requires that
it is measured in such a way as to ensure these four assumptions hold. Rationalization of the
nal assumption can be found in Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014a). Furthermore, for
ease of analysis, assume 0 > a.
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ceeds not pursuing a conviction and the utility to plea bargaining is greater than
taking the case to trial (since the cost of trial is high relative to the expected
sanction received). For cases with  < p, a = n. Assuming the prosecutors
utility is proportional to welfare, this outcome represents the optimal one for
society.
The budgets of public prosecutors are limited, which inhibits their ability to
prosecute all cases that come before them. The optimal outcome just described
presumes there are no resource constraints (so that the prosecutor need only
weigh the marginal benet to prosecution to its marginal cost). Limiting the
total funds available adjusts the two margins described. The threshold which
divides the decision to pursue a conviction at trial versus settle at the negotiating
table shifts to the right to conserve on o¢ ce resources. The logic of this result
is that the benet of a trial for those cases near 0 is not much greater than the
return from plea bargaining (there is zero gain at 0). With limited resources
the last case a prosecutor would be able to dispose of would be one where u (p)
is substantially greater than zero. Shifting the action for the case near 0 to
a = p conserves on the costs, allowing for more case disposition improving total
well-being. Similarly, the critical value of  that denes the decision to engage
in plea bargaining from the decision to not pursue a conviction also shifts to the
right. Denote the optimal value of the rst as e and the second as b.
It is instructive for the analysis that follows to derive this result. Let F ()
denote the distribution function over the support [0; m] for the realization of
the case characteristics, . For example, then, if the prosecutor selects a = n










CtdF () + c: (3)
The prosecutor selects the thresholds 1 and 2 to maximize the total utility
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p b 0 e




[P ()  Cp] dF () +
Z m
2
[S ()  Ct] dF () : (4)
Given the assumptions of the model, the optimal decisionmaking for the prose-
cutor is to select the 1 and 2 that maximize U while satisfying (4).
A decrease in 2 to expand the number of trials results in an increase to
utility of [D (2)  ] f (2) d2. Since the u (a) is increasing in  for a = p
and a = t, so long as the budget constraint constrains the activities of the
prosecutor (which it will in equilibrium), this expansion requires an increase in
1. This decreases utility by   [D (1)  ] f (1) d1. The optimal prosecutorial
decisionmaking with resource constraints is at the point where the marginal
e¤ects are equal and the budget is exhausted. In essence, the marginal rate of
substitution equates with the relate pricesof the two goods (i.e., costs of the
modes of prosecution). This denes e and the second as b. Figure 1 illustrates.
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2.2 Decisionmaking with Retention Concerns Under Asym-
metric Information and a resource constraint
The previous analysis considered a civic-minded prosecutor. She is interested
in obtaining sti¤ sentences for those she believes commits crimes, but also bal-
ances the sanction with the costs incurred. Empirical evidence of prosecutorial
decisionmaking illustrates that when re-election pressures are high prosecutors
act more aggressively by taking more cases to trial. This consistent with argu-
ments that due to asymmetric information between the incumbent prosecutor
and the voting public, trials garner longer sentences and publicity that voters
use as signals of the prosecutors skill.
Thus, to incorporate retention concerns into this framework assume that
with re-elections, when the sti¤er sanction is pursued at trial, the prosecutor
receives an additional bonus, b. The details of why this is consistent with voters
optimal behavior is analyzed in Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014a; 2014b)
and is not repeated here. One may think about the bonus, for example, as
the expected benet a prosecutors re-election campaign gains from a particular
case going to trial. If the prosecutor either declines to pursue a conviction or
makes a plea bargain, this gain is not realized. To extend the previous analysis
assume that while u (p) and u (n) remain unchanged, the payo¤ from a case
going to trial is now
ub (t) = S ()  Ct + b:




[P ()  Cp] dF () +
Z m
2
[S ()  Ct + b] dF () : (5)
The bonus the prosecutor receives for taking a case to trial during a re-election
campaign opens up the potential for a wedge driven between her preferences and
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S   Ct + b
b bb eb e
social welfare, consequently distorting in the outcomes of the criminal justice
system.
Dene eb and bb as the threshold values with the bonus. With this additional
bonus the previous outcome is no longer optimal. The marginal benet to a
decrease in 2, i.e., taking more cases to trial, increases. As a consequence,eb < e. Additionally, the shift in resources towards jury trials comes as the
expense of fewer pleas and total fewer cases investigated so that b < bb. Figure
2 illustrates the outcome with retention concerns.
Thus, in an environment with resource constraints and retention concerns
one would predict that the number of jury trials would increase, the number
of plea bargains would decrease, and the number of unresolved, pending cases
would increase as compared to the outcome without re-election concerns.
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2.3 Decisionmaking with Retention Concerns and Slack
Resources
While the previous subsection considered a distortion to prosecutorial decision-
making when courtroom convictions provide information to voters, an alterna-
tive hypothesis is that the observed increase in jury trials illustrated in previous
empirical research comes from additional e¤ort exerted by incumbents. Prose-
cutors may value their leisure as well as choose to retain some of their available
resources for personal use other than increased prosecution. This implies that
the prosecutors do not completely utilize their resource constraint. Voters in-
terested in maximizing the number of convictions, given the dollars spent on
the prosecutors o¢ ce, may exert pressure on the incumbent to expand its pros-
ecution.
One way to formalize this hypothesis is to suppose a gain is received for each
conviction obtained during re-election season. The gain is received regardless
of whether the sentence is obtained via plea bargaining or jury trial. Denote
the gain as g. The gain is not earned, though, if a conviction is not pursued
(a = n).5 Other than the utility from prosecution, u (a), and the gain, the
prosecutor benets from the unexerted resources. If e is the right-hand-side
of (3), then the incumbent benets from r   e. Let the payo¤ from this be





[P ()  Cp + g] dF ()+
Z m
2
[S ()  Ct + g] dF ()+w (r   e) (6)
if, as before, all cases with   2 have a = t, cases with  2 [1; 2) have a = p,
and a = n otherwise.
5Our main purpose is to show that if voters reward more active prosecutors, with slack
resources they will pursue more charges (rather than leave pending) and so we do not add
the complication of making the bonus vary by trial or plea. We can think of the prosecutors
re-election chances improving with more cases pursued. Hence, the bonus can be interpreted
as the monetary value that a prosecutor assigns to an increased probability of re-election.
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This setup is an extension of Rasmusen, Raghav, and Ramseyer (2009) who
consider the e¤ect of an expansion of prosecutorsbudgets on the extensive mar-
gin (the number of convictions pursued) and the intensive margin (the amount
of resources devoted to each case). Like them, we assume the prosecutor gains
from un-utilized resources and from convictions pursued.
Denote the thresholds selected in equilibrium as eg and bg. It is straightfor-
ward to conduct a comparative analysis of the outcomes that arise. Without the
gain to exerting e¤ort (g = 0), both thresholds shift to the right as compared
to the baseline analyzed in subsection 2.1, e and b. The benet to prosecution
is balanced against both the cost of the prosecution along with the disutility of
e¤ort from expending the resources. Thus, fewer trials arise and more cases are
left pending when e¤ort exertion is costly.
The election campaign, modeled as a non-zero value of g, adds the incentive
to use more of the prosecutorial resources. This will shift both thresholds to the
left.
As a consequence, if one considers e¤ort when resources are slack, then
the e¤ect of the re-election campaign is straightforward. There will be more
trials and there will be fewer cases left pending. It is not necessarily clear
what the impact will be on the amount of plea bargaining undertaken without
making strong assumptions regarding the distribution function F since both the
threshold between trial and pleas shifts out, increasing plea bargaining, but the
cuto¤ for prosecuting a case also increases, decreasing plea bargaining.
The primary distinction between the two hypothesis developed in subsections
2.2 and 2.3 is the e¤ect of the re-election campaign on the number of cases
left pending. If the behavior of prosecutors is distorted towards encouraging
more trials, which is consistent with a theory of signaling in an asymmetric
information environment (without slack resources), then the number of cases left
13
unresolved should increase when retention concerns are great. If the behavior
of prosecutors is shifted towards exerting more e¤ort when retention pressures
are substantial, then there will be fewer unresolved cases.
3 Data
Data on crime, convictions, and elections in North Carolina are collected. While
there are one hundred counties in the state, there are only forty-three prosecu-
torial districts. More heavily populated counties, such as Mecklenburg county
which contains the city of Charlotte, make up an entire district. More rural,
less-populated counties are grouped together into a single prosecutorial district.
Each district has one chief public prosecutor known as the District Attorney
who is elected by voters to serve a four-year term. Each district attorney has
a team of assistant district attorneys (ADAs) and other supporting sta¤. In
2007, for example, the average number of ADAs per o¢ ce in NC is 14.8 with
16.9 supporting sta¤ members.6
Data for felony prosecutions are collected from the North Carolina Sentenc-
ing and Policy Advisory Commission. Each year the Commission publishes the
North Carolina Trial Court Caseload report.7 The report provides data on the
ling and disposing of criminal charges for the scal year from July 1 to June
30 of the following year. Data are collected from the 1999-2000 scal year to
the 2009-10 scal year. Thus, the data set covers eleven years of convictions
in NC. Only felony convictions are considered here. In each year a variety of
information is available. The report provides for each district the total number
of led cases over the year and pending cases at the end of the year. Informa-
tion is given on how many cases went to trial, ended in guilty pleas, and how
many were dismissed. Furthermore, the average age of the cases disposed of is
6From Census of State Prosecutors, 2007 ; www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies33202.
7www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Statistics/Caseload.asp
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calculated for the year for a district.
From this information the variable pending measures the total number of
cases left unresolved at the end of the year. Furthermore, the di¤erence be-
tween pending and the number of unresolved cases from the previous year is
the variable backlog. Hence, pending captures the absolute level of the queue
and backlog measures the change in this level. These two are used as de-
pendent variables to identify the e¤ect of election pressures on the caseload.
Additionally, dismiss measures the proportion of disposed cases that are dis-
missed. Cases can be disposed of by being dismissed, or by a conviction being
pursued (either through a guilty plea or jury trial). This will also be used as a
dependent variable to assess how challenged incumbents handle their jobs. The
total number of cases led, filed, the total number of trials, trials, and the
mean number of days from the day of ling charges to the day of disposal, age,
are used as caseload control variables. The number of charges led captures the
direct demand side for prosecutorial services, while the number of trials and the
age of the cases potentially a¤ects the distribution of e¤ort and resources in the
o¢ ce.
Furthermore, socio-economic variables are created to control for di¤erences
between the districts and within a district over time. Population data are col-
lected from the North Carolina O¢ ce of State Budget and Management.8 An-
nual, county-level population estimates are provided. Hence, density calculates
the number of individuals who live in a district in each year divided by the
number of square miles the district covers. The variable %16   24 measures
the fraction of a districts population that is between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-four. Additionally, the O¢ ce provides data on the number of males and
8www.osbm.state.nc.us/ncosbm/facts_and_gures/socioeconomic_data/population_
estimates/county_estimates.shtm provides the data and a description of the estimation
procedures used.
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the number of whites in each county in each year. Thus, white is the fraction of
the population of a district who are identied as white and male is the fraction
of the district in each year that is male. Additionally, district-level labor mar-
ket data are collected from the Employment Securities Commission of North
Carolina. The unemployment rate, ur, and the labor force participation rate,
lfpr, are used as a control for economic opportunities and the opportunity cost
of crime.9
There are four circumstances where the composition of the district changed.
While at no time was a county split between multiple districts, in four situations
a prosecutorial district which contained multiple counties was split into two
districts. In the scal years 1999-2000 to 2005-06 there were thirty-nine districts.
District 20 initially contained four counties. For the 2006 election one county
was split from the others to create districts 20a and 20b. The incumbent vacated
the position and, therefore, two newly created districts originated in 2006. Also,
district 29 contained ve counties. Two of the counties were split o¤ to create
a new district, 29a, and an open election was held in 2006 to ll the vacancy.
The remaining counties were relabeled 29b and the same DA who had been an
unchallenged incumbent was again unchallenged for the position. Thus, 29b is
considered a continuation of 29. Hence, for the 2006-07 and 2007-08 scal years
there were forty-one prosecutorial districts. Initially, district 22 contained four
counties. While in 2006 an individual ran unopposed to ll a vacant seat, by
the 2008 election the district was divided into two separate districts each with
two counties. The incumbent remained the DA for the district, 22b, and an
election was held for the newly created district, 22a. Thus, 22b is considered
a continuation of 22. Finally, one county was split from district 19b to create
a brand new district, 19d, in the 2008 election creating a new district. As a
9Labor data are obtained from www.nces.com. Labor force participation rate is simply
calculated as the labor force divided by the population.
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result, for the 2008-09 and 2009-10 scal years there are forty-three prosecutorial
districts. Consequently, there are 441 observations.
Finally, election data are collected from the North Carolina State Board of
Elections.10 Dummy variables are created to capture the election outcomes.
The dummy variable CI is equal to one if the incumbent of a district runs for
re-election in the next year and has a challenger either in the primary or the
general election (or both).11 CI is equal to zero if there is no upcoming election,
if the incumbent is not running for re-election, or if the incumbent is running
for re-election but does not have a competitor. Since the data are measured
in scal years the campaigning, challenger entry, and primary contests occur in
the scal year prior to the general election. Adjustments to the prosecutors
decisionmaking is, then, expected to occur in the scal year before the general
election. Note that the year of the election includes eight months of post-
election outcomes, which will likely not be a¤ected by previous or future election
campaigns.12
Second, the dummy variable reelect is equal to one if it is the year before
an incumbent runs for re-election. Relect is equal to zero if it is not the year
before an election or if it is the year before an election but the incumbent does
not run for re-election in the following year.
These variables are used to measure re-election pressures. It is posited that
in the year before a re-election campaign an incumbent, if she does adjust her
behavior to the election cycle, will respond more in that year than the previous
10www.sboe.state.nc.us
11Since the scal year begins July 1 of the calendar year and the general election is in
November of the year, the election is considered within the year if the general election is held
in the scal year. This implies, though, that the voting for the primaries occur just before the
beginning of the scal year in which they are recorded.
12 If, in the results presented in the next section, CIt+1 and reelectt+1 were measured for
the year of the election and added to the specications (either substituting or in addition to
CI and reelect), then they are insignicant and do not a¤ect the sign and signicance of CI
and reelect. Hence, empirically, this is the appropriate measurements of election pressures.
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years. We assume voters focus more heavily on the prosecutors performance
in the year prior to the election as well. This is a common assumption in the
literature on political business cycles (Rogo¤, 1990; Rogo¤ and Siebert, 1988).
Additionally, information on the political party of the prosecutor is available.
The variable rep is equal to one if and only if the incumbent in the district in
that year is a Republican. Since no third-party candidate won a race (in only a
few cases una¢ liated or Libertarian challengers entered the general election) a
value of rep = 0 indicates a district with a Democrat as its prosecutor for the
year.
Table 1 presents the variables of interest to the econometric model.
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
variable description
dependent variables
backlog change in # of cases pending from one year to the next
pending # of cases left unresolved at the end of the year
dismiss # of cases dismissed / # of cases disposed
election variables
CI =1 if in the next year the incumbent is challenged
reeleect =1 if in the next year the incumbent runs for re-election
caseload variables
filed # of new cases led during the year
trial # of cases taken to trial
age avg # of days between ling charges and disposing of the case
socio-economic variables
density population / mile2
%16  24 % of population between the ages of 16 and 24
male % of population that is male
white % of population that is white
ur unemployed / (employed + unemployed)
lfpr labor force / population
rep =1 if the incumbent is a Republican
Additionally, district and year xed e¤ects are included. Table 2 presents the
descriptive statistics.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
mean st. dev. min max
dependent variables
backlog 66.551 310.14 -1085 1932
pending 1543.1 1280.3 114 8310
dismiss 0.1759 0.0659 0.0395 0.3589
election variables
CI 0.0544 0.2271 0 1
reeleect 0.2109 0.4084 0 1
caseload variables
filed 2574.6 1770.7 529 10077
trial 50.420 40.722 1 225
age 202.74 55.911 81.874 475.00
socio-economic variables
density 269.45 294.69 35.806 1698.5
%16  24 0.1295 0.0235 0.0952 0.2052
male 0.4905 0.0098 0.4685 0.5280
white 0.7409 0.1559 0.3489 0.9772
ur 0.0631 0.0217 0.0127 0.1442
lfpr 0.4843 0.0428 0.3742 0.5721
rep 0.2857 0.2857 0 1
While DA o¢ ces in NC have large caseloads, many of which are not disposed
of in the year, the backlog of cases is growing over the sample period. Less than
2% of the cases go to trial and the typical case takes seven months to be disposed
of. Districts vary signicantly in population and racial composition. Just how
prevalent is contested district attorney elections? As stated, each DA serves a
four-year term. In North Carolina elections occur in every other year. Table 3
provides information on the elections in North Carolina.
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Table 3: Prosecutor Elections in North Carolina
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 total
# of 37 4 37 4 39 4 39 164
elections
# of contested 11 0 5 1 10 1 8 36
general
# of contested 7 2 9 0 12 1 3 34
primary
# uncontested 19 2 25 3 21 2 30 102
elections
# of 5 3 6 2 12 1 7 36
vacancies13
Contests are somewhat common. In 22:0% of the elections there was a
contest in the general election, while in 20:7% of the elections there was a
contest in a primary. The majority of the districts hold elections in a year
di¤erent from the U.S. Presidential election, but as of the 2008 election 9:3%
districts hold elections in the year of the Presidential election.
4 Results
Figure 3 is a ow chart of the handling of cases in a public prosecutors o¢ ce
for a year. The inow consists of newly led cases and the number of cases
pending from the previous year. Each case is either disposed of during the
year or left pending for the next year. Of those disposed, the charges can be
either dismissed or a conviction can be pursued. If the prosecutor pursues a
conviction in a case, she may either obtain a guilty plea or may take the case to
trial. Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014b) have illustrated, also using data
from North Carolina, that the distribution of the pursued cases is a¤ected by re-
election pressures - more cases are taken to trial relative to the total number of
pursued cases. This analysis takes it a step further by looking at how this a¤ects
13 Information on whether an interim district attorney, appointed by the Governor, was
running for election is not available. Thus, a seat is considered vacant if the individual,
victorious in the previous election, did not run in either the primary or general election.
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the ability to process cases as a consequence of re-election pressures a¤ecting
the number of trials pursued.
Consider the e¤ect of retention concerns on how many cases are disposed of
and how many are left pending. If the election increases the size of the queue,
then the number of cases left pending at the end of the year, pending, will be
greater, ceteris paribus. Similarly, more cases will be left pending at the end of
the year than were pending at the beginning of the year. Hence, the variable
backlog will grow. Fixed e¤ects specications are estimated to control for the
e¤ects of year (e.g. macroeconomic shocks) and districts (e.g. o¢ ce-specic
information). Both backlog and pending are used as the dependent variable. If
prosecutorial decisionmaking is invariant to the political cycle, then CI should
have a statistically insignicant e¤ect, while if elections provide incentives for
e¤ort exertion, then there should be a negative relationship between re-election
pressure and cases pending and the backlog. Table 4 presents the xed e¤ects
estimation results. HAC robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Fixed E¤ects Results (N = 441)
backlog pending
CI 164.411 ** 97.931 **
(68.164) (43.398)
reelect -113.154 ** 16.207
(51.033) (49.422)
rep 286.300 *** 193.469
(95.330) (155.488)




age -0.9469 *** 3.5717 ***
(0.3590) (0.5231)




white 1655.59 ** -1333.22
(804.191) (1992.94)






year e¤ects? YES YES
adj R2 0.121 0.968
F 1.92 *** 200.02 ***
AIC 6315.9 6111.1
* 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
HAC robust standard errors are reported.
The results in Table 4 illustrate that re-election pressure, in the form of a
challenger entering the race, increases the number of pending cases and the size
of the case backlog. CI is positive and statistically signicant in all specication.
This coincides with the predictions of the theory that asymmetric information
regarding the skills of the incumbent lead to distortions in the prosecutors
decisionmaking.
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In both specications CI, as stated, has a positive and statistically signi-
cant e¤ect on the queue. Using the mean value of backlog of 66:551 from Table
2 , the results imply that at the mean the number of unresolved cases increases
by (164:411  113:154) / 66:551 = 77:0% if the incumbent is being challenged
in her re-election campaign, as compared to districts in years without an incum-
bent running for re-election. Similarly, the number of pending cases at the end
of the year increases by (97:931 + 16:207) / 1543:1 = 7:4% at the mean if the
incumbent is being challenged in her re-election campaign. In other words, the
number of unresolved cases is growing in North Carolina and the level as well
as the rate of the increase accelerates when there are retention concerns. The
entrance of a challenger has a substantial impact on the queue.
The coe¢ cient on reelect is negative in the specications with backlog as
the dependent variable, which implies that uncontested incumbents accelerate
the growth in the number of cases they dispose of relative to years and in
districts without an election. While not reported here, this result is signicant,
though, only when year xed e¤ects are included. Thus, it is not robust to
changes in the specication. The variable reelect is statistically insignicant
when attempting to explain the absolute number of pending cases. Its exclusion,
along with withholding the year e¤ects (which are jointly insignicant in both
specications), increases the adjusted R2, the F -stat, and reduces the AIC.
Hence, it is the entrance of a challenger when an incumbent is running for
re-election that has the important e¤ect on the queue.
Table 4 presents HAC-robust standard errors, as is common in panel-data
analysis. Alternatively, if unadjusted, heteroskedasticity-robust, or clustered
(by either district or by year) standard errors are calculated, the statistical
signicance of the coe¢ cient on CI persists in both models. Additionally, an
F -test of the linear restriction that the coe¢ cients on CI and reelect sum to
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zero rejects the null hypothesis that they are equal for the models with both
pending and backlog as dependent variables. Thus, it is the re-election concern
that expands case backlogs.14
The caseload variables are, as expected, important in explaining the queue.
An increase in the number of led cases increases the number of pending cases,
which results from expanded demand for prosecutorial services, and increases the
size of the backlog, which indicates an increasing returns to caseload pressures.
The age of the cases disposed of has a negative and statistically signicant
impact on the backlog and a positive and statistically signicant impact on
the number of pending cases. Thus, a district in a year with older cases has
more cases left pending at the end of the year since caseloads are large, but
experiences a decrease in the size of the backlog since older cases are more likely
to be disposed of as compared to newer cases. An F -test of the joint hypothesis
that the caseload variables have no e¤ect can be rejected (p-value < 0.001 in
both specications).
With regards to the socio-economic variables, an increase in the percentage of
the districts population in a year that is between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
four increases the number of pending cases, but decreases the case backlog. This
can be explained by such districts having a higher case volume composed of
more minor crimes, which increases the level of pending cases (the correlation
between %16 24 and trial is  0:084 with a p-value of 0:076), but are disposed
of in short order and, therefore, does not a¤ect the size of the backlog. The
gender and racial distribution does not have much of an e¤ect on the number of
pending cases or the size of the increase in the case backlog. Neither does the
labor market variables, ur and lfpr. Since xed e¤ect specications are used,
14The alternative standard error calculations are done on the Pooled OLS specication
including caseload and socio-economic controls, along with district and year e¤ects. Similarly,
the F -test are done on the Pooled OLS base model including the caseload and socio-economic
controls.
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changes in these variables within a district are unimportant to understanding
changes in the queue in these districts, but rather, di¤erences between districts
have a signicant inuence.15 An F -test of the joint hypothesis that the socio-
economic variables are insignicant can be rejected (p-value < 0.01) in the rst
but not the second specication.
There are two additional considerations. First, the dependent variables are
measured in absolute terms. The districts, though, vary substantially in size.
The population of the districts range from only 55,135 to as large as 900,068
and the total caseloads (the newly led plus the number of cases pending from
the previous year) range from 730 cases to be dealt with in a district in a
year to 17,828. Hence, estimations with the dependent variables normalized by
the total caseload, backrate and pendrate are considered. Second, the district
xed e¤ects are (jointly) signicant determinants of the case queue. It seems
reasonable to presume that unobservable determinants of the case backlog may
be correlated with the district e¤ects so that the error term is correlated with
the district in which the cases are being dealt with. Hence, random e¤ects
specications are conducted as a robustness check. Table 5 presents the results.
Table 5: Additional Results (N = 441)
15 In a Pooled-OLS specication including only the caseload and socio-economic variables
density, white, and %16  24 are all statistically signicant explanatory variables of backlog.
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FE FE RE RE
backrate pendrate backlog pending
CI 0.0360 * 0.0321 ** 161.012 ** 104.765 *
(0.0187) (0.0122) (72.114) (60.859)
reelect -0.0199 -0.0053 -43.429 -10.7318
(0.0143) (0.0106) (41.056) (33.388)
controls:
caseload YES YES YES YES
socio-economic YES YES YES YES
year YES YES NO NO
adj R2 0.113 0.706
F 1.85 *** 17.02 ***
AIC -1026.6 -1317.8 6297.1 6689.5
* 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
HAC robust standard errors are reported in FE.
The sign and signicance of CI is maintained when the queue variables are
normalized by the size of the caseloads. An F -test of the joint null hypothesis
that the district xed e¤ects are zero is rejected (p-value < 0.001) in the rst
two specications. Likewise, the importance of a contested re-election campaign
is conrmed in the random e¤ects specications. A Hausman test fails to reject
the null hypothesis of consistent estimates (p-value < 0.001) for both the third
and fourth specications.
A number of robustness checks are conducted. First, as described in the
previous section, four districts where each divided within the sample period.
Hence, the results presented use an unbalanced panel. The results, though,
are not sensitive to the deletion of these districts to create a balanced panel.
Also, three districts in North Carolina are signicantly larger than the rest.
The populations are greater and the total number of cases to be dealt with are
substantial. One may expect the elected, chief prosecutor in smaller districts to
have more of an inuence in the decisionmaking within each case and, therefore,
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case disposition may be di¤erent than these large districts.16 The signicance of
CI is maintained and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is greater when the three
large districts are omitted. Hence, the results of Table 4 are not sensitive to the
use of an unbalanced panel or the inclusion of large districts. These additional
results are available upon request.
Another concern is that the caseload variables su¤er from potential problems
of reverse causality. First, the value of filed is exogenous since it is uncorrelated
with the election variables and is expected to be determined primarily by the
number of crimes committed and the amount invested in law enforcement. The
number of trials and the age of the cases are expected to be endogenously de-
termined by the prosecutor responding to his/her incentives. Eliminating trial
and age from the specications presented in Tables 4 and 5 do not substantially
a¤ect the sign, magnitude, and statistical signicance. Hence, their inclusion
does not a¤ect the main results. Similarly, while the number of trials under-
taken by the prosecutor may lead to an increase in the backlog due to less time
and resources available to dispose of other cases, a large number of pending
cases may lead a prosecutor to reduce the number of trials. Hence, there may
be reverse causality. There is evidence of this reverse causality in the observa-
tion that trial has a negative coe¢ cient in each of the specications in Table 4.
Under an assumption of sequential exogeneity, lagged values of trial, triallag,
are expected to be correlated with trial, but have no e¤ect on the number of
unresolved cases at the end of the year. The correlation between triallag and
trial is 0.8106 (p-value < 0.001). Similarly, if a district in a year has a number
of older cases, then they may be given priority in the o¢ ce and less attention
is given to newer cases, which may lead to an increase in the case backlog. Al-
ternatively, as the queue grows the time it takes each case to be resolved, on
16Alternatively, those in larger districts may be more politically-motivated looking to move
into a statewide o¢ ce (e.g. attorney general or governor).
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average, expands. Hence, the case backlog may lead to an aging of the cases.
Again, under an assumption of sequential exogeneity, previous values of age,
agelag, are correlated with the age of the current periods cases (the correlation
between age and agelag is 0.8069 with a p-value < 0.001), but not with the
number of cases left pending at the end of the current term. Hence, agelag
and triallag can be used as instruments in 2SLS. This method is employed in
Dimitrova-Grajzl, Grajzl, Sustersic, and Zujc (2012b) estimating the impact of
an expansion in the number of judges on case backlogs in Slovenia.
Table 6 presents the second-stage results. Each specication includes a con-
stant term, filed, the socio-economic variables, and uses triallag and agelag as
instruments.
Table 6: 2SLS Results (N = 396)
backlog backrate pending pendrate
CI 155.496 ** 0.0351 * 270.861 ** 0.0482 ***
(73.474) (0.0183) (107.056) (0.0172)
reelect -42.469 -0.0042 -54.412 -0.0075
(41.563) (0.0103) (60.560) (0.0097)
adj R2 0.043 0.018 0.886 0.434
F 2.52 *** 1.63 *** 255.16 *** 22.45 ***
AIC 17473.3 10897.3 17711.8 10836.4
* 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
HAC robust standard errors are reported.
While the number of observations is reduced, since one less year can be used
in the estimation, the results of Table 6 conrm those of Tables 4 and 5. An
incumbent challenged in his/her re-election campaign increases the number of
cases left pending and increases the growth of the case backlog. The statistical
signicance of CI is improved with the correction for reverse causality. The
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signicance of reelect is lacking, which implies that the important e¤ect of
election concerns is the presence of a challenger.
The previous results indicate that, while the inowsduring the challenged
re-election year do not change (the correlation between CI and filed is -0.058
and the number of cases left pending from the previous year is -0.056), there is an
increase in the number of cases left pending at the end of the year. As illustrated
in Figure 1, the increase in the number of pending cases must coincide with a
decrease in the number of disposed cases. The question becomes where does
this reduction come from. Are fewer cases dismissed or are fewer convictions
pursued?
The dependent variable to consider, therefore, is the proportion of disposed
cases that are dismissed, dismiss. If a re-election campaign does not cause
distortions to prosecutorsdecisionmaking, then one would not expect change
in the distribution of disposed cases. If the incumbent is ramping up her con-
victions to be retained, then one would expect election pressures to decrease
this proportion. Table 7 presents results. Both xed e¤ects and random e¤ects
specications are reported.
Table 7: Results (dep. var. = dismiss, N = 441)
FE FE RE
CI -0.0150 * -0.0174 ** -0.0151 *
(0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0084)
reelect 0.0122 * 0.0054 0.0041
(0.0065) (0.0042) (0.0046)
controls:
caseload YES YES YES
socio-economic YES YES YES
year YES NO NO
adj R2 0.769 0.772
F 23.21 *** 27.61 ***
AIC -1732.9 -1746.9 -1082.3
* 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% level.
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HAC robust standard errors are reported in FE.
In the xed e¤ects model, an F -test of the joint null hypothesis that the
district e¤ects have a common intercept can be rejected (p-value < 0.001) and
a Wald test for the joint signicance of the time e¤ects rejects their signicance
(p-value > 0.10). In the random e¤ects model, a Hausman test fails to reject
the hypothesis of consistent estimates (p-value < 0.001).
The results illustrate that if an incumbent is running for re-election, then
there is an decrease in the number of dismissed cases relative to the number of
cases disposed of. Thus, the reduction in disposed cases comes at the expense
of fewer dismissed cases. This coincides with the ndings of Dyke (2007). Also,
there is weak evidence that an unchallenged incumbent running for re-election
increases the number of cases dismissed. Since it was shown that there is no
change in the number of cases left pending at the end of the year (Tables 4 and
5), this implies there is a reduction in the number of convictions pursued by
those without a contest.
5 Conclusion
Two competing theories are developed to understand how electoral incentives
a¤ect prosecutor decisionmaking to, in particular, analyze its impact on case
backlogs. We test the implications of the two theories by empirically investi-
gating the impact of elections on the queue. Incumbents who face contested
elections leave more cases unresolved. Consequently, the backlog grows. The
results are consistent with the asymmetric information theory of signaling (with
no slack resources), rather than with increased e¤ort exertion.
There are some issues in the analysis worth clarifying. For instance, one
may be concerned with the potential endogeneity problem of candidate entry.
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This would matter if an unobservable variable drove both entry and backlogs.
However, we do not believe it a¤ects the main results presented here. First,
Bandyopadhyay and McCannon (2014b) analyze similar data from North Car-
olina to address the decision to plea bargain or take a case to trial. Using
entry into judicial races as an instrument, they show that potential endogene-
ity e¤ects from candidate entry in prosecutor races do not a¤ect their results.
Second, as is discussed in the text, the combined e¤ect of CI and reelect is
positive with both dependent variables. Thus, regardless of entry into the race,
re-election concerns extend backlogs and, consequently, the main results are not
driven by the decision to challenge the incumbent. The welfare e¤ects of elec-
tions are however not clear. Does the increased deterrence from more courtroom
prosecutions outweigh the cost to extended queues, along with public nancing
concerns? The empirical analysis cannot provide a full welfare analysis. Fi-
nally, there are numerous other decisions made by a prosecutor not considered
here. For example, the e¤ect of election pressures on which charges to le, the
practices of charge-bargaining versus sentence-bargaining, and the production
of non-prosecution services have not been considered. Also, future work should
consider the di¤usion process within an o¢ ce between election incentives of the
chief DA (as the principal) and the ADAs, as agents.
The research contributes towards the broader issue of optimal institutional
design within the legal system. Should prosecutors be selected through popular,
partisan elections, as is done in most states within the U.S., or should they be
appointed as are U.S. Attorneys as well as prosecutors throughout, for example,
Europe? A complementary analysis of the incentive e¤ects of appointment sys-
tems is needed to fully address this issue. The current work, though, provides
some insight into the way this a¤ects prosecutor decisionmaking. Our analysis
suggests that prosecutor behavior in the United States is consistent with sig-
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naling via increased use of courtroom trials. Consequently, this leads to case
backlogs increasing, implying longer queues to be served in the criminal justice
system.
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